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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the Dakota-U.S. War of 1862, a demand 
arose in Minnesota for “extermination or removal” of all Dakota 
people from the state.  Congress responded by passing an Act on 
February 16, 1863 that unilaterally “abrogated and annulled” all of 
the treaties with the four bands of Indigenous people known as the 
Dakota Oyate (Nation).1  But Congress was not content with simply 
abrogating the treaties.  This Act of Congress also included 
provisions that purported to seize the Dakota homeland.2  
Furthermore, in a companion Act passed fifteen days later, on 
March 3, 1863, Congress laid down the groundwork for the forced 
removal of all Dakota people to an unspecified reservation located 
beyond the boundaries of any state in the union.3  In taking this 
legislative action, Congress, using the 1862 Dakota-U.S. War as 
pretext, purported to take title to the Dakota homeland and the 
steps needed to secure sole possession of it to the exclusion of the 
Dakota people through a program of ethnic cleansing of genocidal 
proportion.  In the late spring of 1863, the United States mounted 
a military campaign that extended into 1864 to complete the 
banishment of the Dakota from their ancestral homeland that these 
congressional acts mandated. 
The explicit language of the abrogation, seizure, and forced 
removal clauses of these acts has led many to hold the view that the 
twelve treaties concluded between the United States and the 
Dakota between 1805 and 1858 are null and void—artifacts of the 
past that now rest in the dustbin of history.4  But the simple, oft 
 
 1.  Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, 12 Stat. 652. 
 2.  Id. § 1. 
 3.  Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 819. 
 4.  It is interesting to note that among the leading scholarly discussions of 
the 1862 Dakota-U.S. War and its aftermath, the abrogation of the Dakota treaties 
is mentioned relatively briefly without any extended analysis of the legal justification 
of the actual abrogation clause.  See, e.g., KENNETH CARLEY, THE DAKOTA WAR OF 
1862: MINNESOTA’S OTHER CIVIL WAR 76 (2d ed. 1976); 2 WILLIAM WATTS FOLWELL, 
A HISTORY OF MINNESOTA 246–48, 258–59 (rev. ed. 1961); ROY W. MEYER, HISTORY 
2
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repeated statement that the abrogation of the treaties rendered the 
Dakota homeless, without rights and legally subject to the removal 
and exile they experienced, is false and misleading.  It is a far more 
complex matter than that.  To understand this we need to look 
carefully at the legal arguments that might be offered to justify 
these statutes and press our analysis to the very foundation on 
which federal Indian law is based.  When we do, we shall encounter 
a profoundly disturbing story about America’s original sin of ethnic 
cleansing against the Indigenous people of North America 
undertaken as an expression of the self-proclaimed manifest 
destiny of the republic and the role it played in the founding of the 
State of Minnesota.  It is a story that is rarely told, even though it 
continues to play a large role in shaping the politics, law, and 
culture of our shared life. 
But why even consider revisiting this story today, you might 
ask?  Legally aren’t the treaties a dead letter in light of their 
wholesale abrogation by Congress in 1863?  At first glance it might 
seem so because the domestic American law of Indian treaty 
abrogation is quite clear.  While the U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that treaties concluded by the United States with Indian Tribes are 
clearly part of the law of the land5 and bind the federal government 
to carry out the obligations it undertakes in such treaties,6 it has 
also held that Congress may unilaterally abrogate such treaties 
without an explicit statement, as long as there is “clear evidence” of 
congressional intent to abrogate the treaty in cases where 
subsequent legislation appears to be inconsistent with one or more 
of its provisions.7  The abrogation clause of the February 16, 1863, 
Act states quite simply that “all treaties heretofore made and 
entered into by the [four bands of Dakota] with the United States, 
are hereby declared to be abrogated and annulled, so far as said 
treaties or any of them purport to impose any future obligation on 
the United States.”8  Thus it seems clear beyond any doubt that 
Congress explicitly acted to abrogate all treaties with the Dakota 
people in such a way as to make the legal question of whether the 
treaties had been abrogated in this instance an easy case.  But that 
 
OF THE SANTEE SIOUX: UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY ON TRIAL 140–41 (rev. ed. 
1993); MARY LETHERT WINGERD, NORTH COUNTRY: THE MAKING OF MINNESOTA 331 
(2010). 
 5.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 6.  Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211 (1872); Wilson v. Wall, 73 U.S. 83 (1867). 
 7.  United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738–40 (1986). 
 8.  Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 652. 
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does not fully answer the question of whether the abrogation clause 
could defeat the obligations the United States had undertaken in 
the Dakota treaties with respect to those Dakota who did not 
actively participate in the war.  Nor does it answer the question of 
whether the subsequent seizure of the Dakota homeland and 
forced expulsion of the Dakota people from that land was legally 
justified by the forfeiture and removal clauses of these acts.  To 
answer these questions about these three clauses (abrogation, 
forfeiture, and removal) in a way that incorporates the factual and 
legal complexity surrounding the questions, we need to look 
carefully at the texts of the abrogation and forfeiture clauses of the 
February 16, 1863 Act, by which Congress purported to seize the 
Dakota lands, and the removal clause of the March 3, 1863 Act, 
which implemented the forced expulsion of the Dakota from their 
homeland.  But, in doing so, we must also “look beyond the written 
words to the larger context that frames the Treaty, including ‘the history 
of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction 
adopted by the parties.’”9  Furthermore, we shall also take seriously 
the task of searching for the underlying legal foundation, if any, of 
this exercise of power by Congress.  When we do that, we shall 
discover that while Congress indeed may have had the power to 
unilaterally withdraw from its obligations under the treaties as a 
matter of international treaty law, ultimately the action it took to 
seize the Dakota homeland and expel them from it is based on the 
Doctrine of Christian Discovery that is without either theological or 
legal foundation, notwithstanding its incorporation by Chief Justice 
Marshall into American domestic law. 
The discussion that follows is organized around three tasks: 
Part I describes the larger context of history that frames these 
congressional acts by focusing on the long road to war and the 
widespread demand for “extermination or removal” of the Dakota 
from Minnesota that erupted in the immediate postwar context 
that prompted these congressional acts; Part II examines the texts 
of these congressional acts with a focus on their abrogation, land 
forfeiture, and forced removal clauses; and Part III addresses the 
 
 9.  Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 
(1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 
432 (1943)) (holding that subsequent actions did not constitute an explicit act of 
abrogation by the United States of the reserved usufructuary rights of the Ojibwe 
(Chippewa), including to hunt, fish, and gather as set forth in the 1837 Treaty of 
the United States with the Chippewa). 
4
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question of what legal authority might be offered to justify these 
congressional acts.  Three sources of law will be considered: the 
International Law of Treaties; the U.S. Constitution; and U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent on the plenary power of Congress over 
Indian affairs.  Special attention will be given to the claim that 
these acts, as an expression of a plenary power of Congress over 
Indian affairs, are rooted in the Doctrine of Christian Discovery.  
The article closes with a conclusion that sets out the implications of 
the foregoing analysis for the next steps that might be taken to heal 
the trauma of America’s past and write a new chapter in federal 
Indian law and policy for the twenty-first century. 
II. THE ARGUMENT IN A NUTSHELL 
The argument to be developed within the foregoing structure 
of this article may be briefly summarized in two points: First, the 
abrogation of the treaties under the congressional action of 1863 
relieved the United States from the obligations it undertook in 
those treaties.  It did not create new rights on the part of the 
United States to the Dakota homeland, nor did it diminish the 
status of the Dakota people, their collective and individual rights, 
or their relationship to their land.  If anything, as a matter of treaty 
law, it recovered for the Dakota the right to full use of their 
homeland.  Furthermore, to claim that the Dakota people lost 
rights or privileges not specified in the treaties as a result of the 
abrogation is a mistake. 
Second, the seizure of Dakota lands and forced removal of the 
Dakota people from that land by the congressional actions of 1863 
is without legal foundation under both international and domestic 
law.  Specifically, the international Doctrine of Discovery, properly 
understood as a legal rule limited to the determination of which 
several Christian European nation-states, engaged in global 
exploration beginning in the fifteenth century, obtained the 
prescriptive right to choose to purchase Indigenous land they had 
“discovered”—a principle which is now repudiated as a matter of 
international law—does not support the congressional action to 
remove the Dakota people from their homeland.  As first 
developed, the Doctrine of Discovery was important for sorting out 
relations between Christian European nation-states engaged in 
expanding their respective empires to the lands of the Indigenous 
nations “discovered” by these growing empires.  Thus, it is a 
mistake to view the Doctrine of Discovery as diminishing the rights 
5
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of the Indigenous people.  Moreover, to claim that the Doctrine of 
Discovery, as received and incorporated by Chief Justice John 
Marshall into domestic law under Johnson v. M’Intosh in 1823,10 and 
refined by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia in 1832,11 is 
the legal basis under domestic law for land seizure and removal is 
an overstatement of the reach of that doctrine as understood by 
Chief Justice Marshall.  The overbroad misapplication of this 
outdated doctrine in subsequent Supreme Court decisions in the 
years immediately following the death of Chief Justice Marshall, 
during the presidency of Andrew Jackson, compounded and 
perpetuated this mistake.  Today it is held to violate the human 
rights of Indigenous people everywhere.  Ultimately, the Doctrine 
of Discovery is Christian doctrine that is without theological 
foundation.  In light of this, the Doctrine of Discovery should now 
be abandoned as a matter of domestic law to conform to the 
growing repudiation of that doctrine under international law. 
III. THE DEMAND FOR “EXTERMINATION OR REMOVAL” OF THE 
DAKOTA: THE POSTWAR CONTEXT FOR READING THE        
ABROGATION ACT OF 1863 
We begin our task of reading the congressional acts of 1863 
with a look at the “larger context that frames the Treat[ies,]”12 
purportedly abrogated by Congress in the February 16, 1863 Act, as 
required by established Supreme Court precedent for determining 
whether abrogation has occurred and the extent of such 
abrogation when present.  We will look at the long road to war 
leading up to 1862, as well as the important immediate aftermath 
of the Dakota-U.S. War of 1862 (“the war” or “the 1862 war”) that 
led to congressional action in 1863. 
 
 10.  21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
 11.  31 U.S. 515 (1832), abrogated by Utah & N. R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 
(1885). 
 12.  Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 
(1999). 
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A. The Long Road to the Dakota-U.S. War of 186213 
The arrival of the Europeans to the land of the Dakota in the 
seventeenth century set up a mutually beneficial relationship that 
continued during the height of the fur trade.  As the fur trade 
began to die out and immigrant-settlers began moving on to 
Dakota land in what was to become the State of Minnesota in the 
nineteenth century, however, the Dakota became debtors, 
dependent upon credit they received from traders to purchase 
food and other goods to supplement what they were still able to 
secure through their traditional ways that included hunting what 
had now become declining populations of game and buffalo.  As 
the wave of immigrant-settlers reached flood stage after the treaties 
of 1851, the relationship between the Dakota and the Europeans 
living among them changed dramatically.  While the number of 
Europeans in the land of the Dakota had been relatively small for 
over two centuries, with the grant of territorial status to Minnesota 
by Congress in 1849 the stage was set for the rapid influx of a new 
kind of European.  These Europeans would not be drawn by the fur 
trade, but rather by the prospect of land for forestry, commercial, 
and, especially, agricultural purposes.  In 1850, it is estimated that 
there were about 6000 people of European origin in Minnesota.  By 
the 1860 census, two years after statehood, the flow of European 
immigrant-settlers brought the number of Europeans to 180,000, a 
thirty-fold increase.14  Where the Dakota had outnumbered the 
Europeans in 1850, they were now surrounded by the Europeans, 
who increasingly intruded upon their traditional hunting grounds 
that had played such a large role in sustaining their life since time 
immemorial.  As a result, the Dakota became more and more 
dependent upon the support of the United States for supplies and 
food to see them through the harsh winters.  Eventually, the 
 
 13.  The story of the road to war as summarized here is drawn from the 
extended accounts found in CARLEY, supra note 4, at 1–75 (including an extended 
discussion of the 1862 war, its causes, and its aftermath); MEYER, supra note 4 
(discussing a comprehensive history of the Dakota); WINGERD, supra note 4, at 
258–300 (including a comprehensive history of the formation of the State of 
Minnesota from the earliest days of the fur trade in the seventeenth century down 
to the war of 1862 and its aftermath); see also GWEN WESTERMAN & BRUCE WHITE, 
MNI SOTA MAKOCE: THE LAND OF THE DAKOTA 133–95 (2012) (discussing the 
Dakota treaties).  The author of the instant article served as a contributor to Mni 
Sota Makoce: The Land of the Dakota and was a co-author of chapter four on the 
Dakota treaties.  See WESTERMAN & WHITE supra at 9, 233–34. 
 14.  RHODA R. GILMAN, THE STORY OF MINNESOTA’S PAST 103 (1989). 
7
Vogel: Rethinking the Effect of the Abrogation of the Dakota Treaties an
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
2013] RETHINKING THE EFFECTS OF ABROGATION 545 
Dakota, who had never been a cash economy people, were drawn 
into the cash economy of the newcomers that was developing as fast 
as these newcomers spread their agricultural and forestry activities 
over the land. 
All of this took place, in large part, through a series of treaties 
between the United States and various representatives of the 
Dakota people that would dispossess the Dakota of their land.  In 
the space of twenty-six years, 1825 to 1851, through three great 
cessions of land under treaties negotiated under increasing 
intimidation, and eventually under outright fraud by 
representatives of the United States, the Dakota people lost 
virtually all of their homeland, except for a small strip of land ten 
miles wide and 140 miles long running along the south shore of the 
Minnesota River in southwestern Minnesota.15  As the Europeans 
settled down on this land that was so new to them, yet so old to the 
Dakota, tensions arose that interfered with the settlers’ lives. 
At first the tensions were primarily the product of feuding and 
violent skirmishes between the Dakota and the Ojibwe.  The Ojibwe 
had gradually moved west into the Dakota homeland due to settler 
pressure they experienced on the eastern portion of their 
traditional homeland.  By the 1750s, they had defeated the Dakota 
after a century of warfare and displaced them from Mille Lacs Lake 
in northern Minnesota, which had been an important center of 
Dakota life and culture.  Periodic violent skirmishes that broke out 
between the Dakota and the Ojibwe became an inconvenience to 
the incoming immigrant-settlers.  This led to the treaty of 1825, 
which attempted to set a boundary between the Dakota and the 
Ojibwe in order to stop the skirmishes and bring peace between 
them.  The line drawn between the Dakota and the Ojibwe was 
designed to separate the Dakota from the Ojibwe by confining the 
Dakota to roughly the southern half of their homeland in the north 
of what eventually became the State of Minnesota in 1858.  
 
 15.  Treaty with the Sioux—Mdewakanton and Wahpakoota Bands, Aug. 5, 
1851, 10 Stat. 954; Treaty with the Sioux—Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands, July 23, 
1851, 10 Stat. 949; Treaty with the Sioux, Sept. 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 538; Treaty with 
the Sioux, Etc., Aug. 19, 1825, 7 Stat. 272.  These four treaties, and the three great 
cessions they affected, are discussed in WESTERMAN & WHITE, supra note 13, at 148–
90.  For an extended discussion of the way in which the human rights of the 
Dakota people were violated by these treaties, see Angelique Townsend 
EagleWoman, Wintertime for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate: Over One Hundred Fifty Years 
of Human Rights Violations by the United States and the Need for a Reconciliation 
Involving International Indigenous Human Rights Norms, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 486 
(2013). 
8
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Although the treaty of 1825 did not contain a cession clause, the 
line to be drawn under the terms of the treaty effectively acted as a 
“cession” of the northern half of the Dakota homeland by securing 
their agreement to relocate to the southern half.  Thus, it effected 
what I have called “the first great cession.”16 
The second great cession occurred under the treaty of 1837 
when the Dakota ceded all of their land east of the Mississippi as 
the settlements in the area of B’dote, a sacred place considered by 
the Dakota to be their place of origin, later to be known as the 
Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, began to take hold.  
Finally, in 1851, in two treaties, the Dakota became almost entirely 
dependent upon the United States for their sustenance with the 
cession of virtually all of their land west of the Mississippi River and 
south of the 1825 treaty line, totaling twenty-four million acres, in 
exchange for promises of annual support.  They retained a 
reservation on the Minnesota River running 140 miles long and ten 
miles wide on each side of the river. 
With the 1851 treaties signed, the land rush was now on, even 
before their ratification in 1853.  In the face of further demands for 
more land for settlement, the small section of reserved land on 
which the Dakota were now expected to live was cut in half in 1858 
by another set of treaties concluded in Washington, D.C., under 
terms that were basically dictated to the Dakota by the United 
States.17 
On the small strip of land to which the Dakota had been 
forcibly relocated, they were unable to sustain themselves through 
their traditional means of hunting, fishing, and gathering.  Their 
lives now depended on the promises of regular support made to 
them by the United States under the treaties.  These promises were 
rarely performed per the terms of the treaties.  Shipments of 
annuity supplies and cash necessary for the Dakota to purchase 
additional needed provisions to sustain life, for example, were 
often late in arriving, adding to the profound uncertainty with 
which the Dakota were forced to live.  By August 1862 their 
circumstances had become desperate.  After what proved to be a 
difficult winter in 1861–1862, once again the annuity shipment of 
goods and cash did not arrive as required in mid-summer.  With 
 
 16.  WESTERMAN & WHITE, supra note 13, at 148–54.  
 17.  Treaty with the Sioux—Mdewakanton and Wahpekute Bands, June 19, 
1858, 12 Stat. 1031; Treaty with the Sioux—Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands, June 
19, 1858, 12 Stat. 1037. 
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the prospect of another difficult winter coming on, and no sign 
that they would have the means to build up provisions to sustain 
them through it, frustration was running high.  The killing of four 
members of a settler family by several young Dakota men near 
Action, Minnesota, on August 17, proved to be the spark that 
ignited war.  At a meeting held that evening, notwithstanding his 
stated reservations about the possibilities for success, Taoyetuduta 
(Little Crow) agreed to lead a group of warriors into battle in an 
effort to drive off the immigrant-settlers and regain control of the 
homeland. 
On the morning of August 18, 1862, the Dakota forces 
attacked the Lower Sioux Agency, where in recent weeks they had 
been rebuffed in their demand to have the provisions that were 
stored there opened and distributed in the absence of the arrival of 
the annuity shipment.  From there they rode down the Minnesota 
River Valley, attacking settlements in their path, and eventually 
engaged in combat with several local militias that were hastily 
raised in defense of these settlements. 
Governor Alexander Ramsey turned to his sometime political 
opponent, Colonel Henry Sibley, to gather a force to respond.  On 
September 23, thirty-seven days after the beginning of the war, the 
Dakota forces were defeated at the Battle of Wood Lake.  On 
September 26, the Dakota surrendered, and Sibley gathered into 
captivity at Camp Release the defeated warriors, plus a large 
contingent of Dakota who had refused to join the war effort, many 
of whom had rescued white refugees fleeing the hostilities.  The 
combined number of Dakota in captivity at Camp Release 
numbered over 1500 people.  On September 28, Sibley convened a 
five-member military commission that he had little authority to 
convene, before which he brought over three hundred warriors to 
face charges.  On some days, the number of “trials” conducted by 
the commission would exceed forty.  Of the 392 warriors put on 
trial, 303 were “convicted” and condemned to death.  Sixteen 
others received prison terms.18  The horrific retributive backlash 
that all Dakota would now experience had begun. 
 
 18.  CARLEY, supra note 4, at 69.  For an extended description of these “trials,” 
see Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 
43 STAN. L. REV. 13 (1990). 
10
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B. The Call for Vengeance in the Immediate Aftermath of the War19 
In the aftermath of the war, widespread demands were voiced 
by private citizens and public officials alike throughout Minnesota 
for the extermination or removal of the Dakota people from 
Minnesota.  Governor Ramsey was among the first, and certainly 
the most prominent public figure, to call for vengeance when, on 
September 9, 1862, he gave the opening address to the special 
session of the legislature he called to deal with state policy for 
conducting the war.  He declared that: 
Our course then is plain.  The Sioux Indians of Minnesota 
must be exterminated or driven forever beyond the 
borders of the State. 
. . . . 
They must be regarded and treated as outlaws.  If any shall 
escape extinction, the wretched remnant must be driven 
beyond our borders and our frontier garrisoned with a 
force sufficient to forever prevent their return.20 
General John Pope, who took federal command of the 
Minnesota forces that had been organized under the command of 
Henry Hastings Sibley, also called for the extermination of the 
Dakota.21  The “trials” before the military commission convened by 
Sibley also became a focus of the demand for vengeance.  The 
Episcopal Bishop of Minnesota, Henry Whipple, who had worked 
with the Dakota, was alarmed by the brevity of the military 
commission proceedings and appealed to President Lincoln to 
intervene.  Lincoln did so, and ordered that the planned execution 
of the 303 warriors condemned to death not go forward until he 
had reviewed all of the records and made his own decision whether 
the death sentences were justified.  Following review of the records 
in these cases, President Lincoln authorized the execution of thirty-
 
 19.  The story of the call for vengeance in the aftermath of the war as 
summarized here is drawn from the extended accounts of it found in the 
following: CARLEY, supra note 4, at 68–82 (discussing the aftermath of the 1862 
war); MEYER, supra note 4, at 123–54 (including a comprehensive history of the 
Dakota); WINGERD, supra note 4, at 312–45 (discussing the aftermath of the 1862 
war); and William E. Lass, The Removal from Minnesota of the Sioux and Winnebago 
Indians, 38 MINN. HIST. 353 (1963) (discussing the removal of the Sioux (Dakota) 
and Ho Chunk (Winnebago) from Minnesota in the aftermath of the 1862 war).  
 20.  Alexander Ramsey, Governor, State of Minn., Annual Message to the 
Legislature of Minn. 12 (Sept. 9, 1862), available at http://archive.leg.state.mn.us 
/docs/NonMNpub/oclc18189672.pdf.  
 21.  See WINGERD, supra note 4, at 313. 
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eight warriors.  This was carried out on the day after Christmas in 
the largest mass execution in U.S. history before a huge crowd in 
Mankato, Minnesota.22 
The death of the thirty-eight was not enough to quell the 
hysteria in Minnesota.  Many people continued to demand 
retribution and expected that further executions would be carried 
out.  Bounties reaching $200 were announced for deaths of Dakota 
people, although few were collected.23  For those who might escape 
the gallows or the bounty hunter, the demand was that they be 
forcibly removed from the state, whether or not they had engaged 
in the hostilities.  This widespread demand was also made 
concerning the Ho Chunk (Winnebago) people who had been 
moved to a reservation on what was considered prime land for 
agriculture and other development near Mankato.  These 
Indigenous people did not support the war and had not engaged in 
it in any way; nevertheless, they too were now included in the call 
for removal beyond the borders of the state.24 
The continuing demand for retribution against all Native 
Americans, including the Ho Chunk people, was expressed in the 
most extreme terms by John C. Wise, the editor of one of the 
Mankato newspapers, when he called for “extermination or 
removal” in a series of newspaper columns and articles.25  A further 
complication at Mankato was the fact that it was well known that 
the warriors who had been condemned to death, but not executed, 
were now imprisoned in Mankato.  Mob violence to lynch these 
prisoners was a real threat and led to the efforts by some who were 
sympathetic to the plight of the Dakota to join the effort to remove 
all of the Dakota for their safety.26 
If Minnesota was no longer a safe place for the Dakota people, 
many settlers concluded it was also not safe for them.  Thus, in the 
aftermath of the war, life changed for both the Dakota people, who 
had from time immemorial called Minnesota their homeland, as 
 
 22.  For an analysis of the basis on which President Lincoln made the 
distinction between who would and would not be executed, see Paul Finkelman, “I 
Could Not Afford to Hang Men for Votes.” Lincoln the Lawyer, Humanitarian Concerns, 
and the Dakota Pardons, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 405 (2013). 
 23.  For a detailed description of the origin of, authorization for, and 
implementation of the bounty program, along with its effect on the Dakota 
people, see MEYER, supra note 4, at 135 & n.3. 
 24.  See WINGERD, supra note 4, at 327–38; Lass, supra note 19, at 353. 
 25.  See Lass, supra note 19, at 353.  See generally CARLEY, supra note 4, at 77. 
 26.  See CARLEY, supra note 4, at 77; WINGERD, supra note 4, at 328–29; Lass, 
supra note 19, at 356. 
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well as for the settlers, who had recently come to the young state 
and lived through the horror of war in their new home.  For the 
Dakota, their immediate postwar experience would consist of 
incarceration followed by banishment from the state.  Many Dakota 
fled to the west, far away from Minnesota.  Others would be 
expelled from Minnesota by military force from 1863 to 1864.  In 
the settlers’ postwar experience, they had to decide whether to 
remain and rebuild their lives or to go on to other locales to pursue 
the dreams that brought them to what they called “the New World.”  
Many settlers left—never to return. 
The United States, in an apparent recognition of the 
continuing debt that was owed the “friendly Dakota” who had 
protected hundreds of settlers during the war, as well as the 
injustice of the treatment they received following the war, took 
steps over the years that followed that purported to provide for the 
well-being of the Dakota people.  A federally recognized 
reservation was set up in 1863 in South Dakota at Crow Creek to 
receive the Dakota expelled from Minnesota.  There could hardly 
have been a less suitable place for the Dakota to attempt to sustain 
themselves by adopting the agricultural methods of the Europeans.  
The land was unable to meaningfully support farming and many 
Dakota died under the harsh circumstances in which they found 
themselves.  Eventually many were able to move to more hospitable 
surroundings.  Four years later, in 1867, a treaty was concluded that 
led to the establishment of reservations for the Dakota at Spirit 
Lake (Devil’s Lake) and at Lake Traverse in territory that 
eventually became North and South Dakota.27  For some Dakota, 
however, their flight took them to lands as far north as Canada or 
west and south to Nebraska, where Dakota communities were 
established.28  Thus, the Dakota entered their long exile from 
Minnesota. 
Nevertheless, Mni Sota Makoce never ceased to be home for 
the Dakota.  Thus, it is not surprising that, starting almost 
immediately after the war, small numbers continued to return to 
their homeland in Minnesota.  Beginning in the 1880s, the federal 
government purchased four small parcels of land in Minnesota that 
led to the establishment of the four federally recognized Dakota 
 
 27.  Treaty with the Sioux––Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands, Feb. 19, 1867, 15 
Stat. 505. 
 28.  An important Dakota community was established at the Santee 
Reservation in Nebraska.  See MEYER, supra note 4, at 155–74. 
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communities in Minnesota today: Upper Sioux, Lower Sioux, 
Shakopee, and Prairie Island.29  A Dakota community that did not 
receive federal recognition also was established at B’dote 
(Mendota) near the confluence of the Minnesota and Mississippi 
rivers.30  Today these communities number a fraction of the larger 
Dakota Oyate.31  Despite these measures, severe damage had been 
done to the Dakota people—culturally, physically, and 
psychologically—which continues to take its toll today. 
Thus, in the aftermath of the war, two peoples, Indigenous 
and European in origin, would not be totally separated as many 
had hoped and as Governor Ramsey had called for in his opening 
address on September 9, 1862 to the special session of the 
Minnesota Legislature that meant to address the circumstances that 
the war had thrust upon the state.  The Dakota people would not, 
as Ramsey had demanded, be “exterminated or driven forever 
beyond the borders of the State.”32 
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL ACTS: RETHINKING THE RELIEF AND 
REMOVAL ACTS OF 1863 
The sentiments for extermination or removal were widely 
held, and they were conveyed all the way to Washington, D.C.  On 
February 16, 1863, six months after the end of the Dakota-U.S. War 
of 1862, Congress responded by passing legislation that unilaterally 
“abrogate[d] and annul[ed]” all of the treaties with the four bands 
of Indigenous people known as the Dakota Oyate (Nation).33  The 
predominant focus of this legislative Act was the establishment and 
administration of a program of financial compensation for the non-
 
 29.  See KATHY DAVIS & ELIZABETH EBBOTT, INDIANS IN MINNESOTA 328 (5th ed. 
2006); MEYER, supra note 4, at 198–241.  Websites of these four communities 
provide further details on these communities: LOWER SIOUX INDIAN COMMUNITY, 
http://www.lowersioux.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2012); PRAIRIE ISLAND INDIAN 
COMMUNITY, http://www.prairieisland.org (last visited Nov.13, 2012); SHAKOPEE 
MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY, http://www.shakopeedakota.org (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2012); UPPER SIOUX COMMUNITY PEZIHUTAZIZI OYATE, http://                 
www .uppersiouxcommunity-nsn.gov (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
 30.  The website of the Mendota Mdewakanton Dakota Community provides 
further details on this community.  See MENDOTA MDEWAKANTON DAKOTA 
COMMUNITY, http://mendotadakota.com/mn (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
 31.  As of 1999, the combined number of enrolled members at the four 
federally recognized Dakota communities in Minnesota numbered 2182.  DAVIS & 
EBBOTT, supra note 29, at 318, 320, 322, 323. 
 32.  Ramsey, supra note 20, at 12. 
 33.  Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, 12 Stat. 652. 
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Indian victims of the war.  This is reflected in the title of the 
legislation: “An Act for the Relief of Persons for Damages Sustained by 
Reason of Depredations and Injuries by Certain Bands of Sioux Indians.”34  
The predominance of the “relief” purpose is also demonstrated by 
the fact that of its ten sections, nine are devoted to the details for 
implementing the “relief” called for under the Act.  
Notwithstanding this fact, since our focus is on the legal effect of 
the abrogation of the Dakota treaties under this Act, I shall refer to 
it as the “Abrogation Act.” 
When it came to the provisions of the Abrogation Act that 
directly affected the Dakota people and their homeland, Congress 
was not content with simply abrogating the Dakota treaties.  The 
Abrogation Act also includes a provision that purports to seize the 
Dakota homeland.35  Even that was not enough to quell the postwar 
hysteria in Minnesota.  Fifteen days after the passage of the 
Abrogation Act, Congress passed the Dakota Removal Act, on 
March 3, 1863, thus laying the groundwork to force the Dakota 
people to an unspecified reservation located beyond the 
boundaries of any state of the union.36  In passing these two acts, 
using the Dakota-U.S. War of 1862 as pretext, Congress purported 
to take title to the Dakota homeland and embark on the steps 
needed to secure sole possession of it to the exclusion of the 
Dakota people through a program of ethnic cleansing of genocidal 
proportion that was enforced through banishment of the Dakota 
from their ancestral homeland.  In the late spring of 1863, the 
United States mounted a military campaign that extended into 
1864 to complete the ethnic cleansing that congressional action 
mandated.37 
We now turn to a close examination of the texts of the 
Abrogation Act and the Dakota Removal Act, which sets the stage 
for Part III when we turn to the important question of what legal 
authority, if any, might be offered to justify the power exercised in 
these acts. 
 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. § 1. 
 36.  Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 819. 
 37.  CARLEY, supra note 4, at 87–92. 
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A. The Abrogation Act of 1863 
The Abrogation Act, adopted on February 16, 1863, contains 
ten sections.  Nine of these establish a program of relief, composed 
of monetary compensation for damages sustained by the white 
victims of depredations by the Sioux Indians during the 1862 war.38  
The first section contains the first mention of the relief program to 
be established, as well as two other clauses: one abrogating the 
Dakota treaties, and the other, a land forfeiture clause, seizing the 
Dakota homeland. 
The relief clause of section 1 announces the rationale for 
compensation of the white victims in the following words: “[I]t is 
just and equitable that the persons whose property has been 
destroyed or damaged by the said Indians, or destroyed or 
damaged by the troops of the United States in said war, should be 
indemnified . . . .”39 Sections 2 through 8 and section 10 establish 
the compensation fund, the commission to preside over fund 
distributions, and the procedures for the operation of the 
commission in hearing claims for compensation and making fund 
distributions.  The relief clause of section 1 makes clear that the 
funds for the compensation of victims will come from the funds 
previously appropriated for payment to the Dakota under the 
obligations the United States undertook in the 1837 and 1851 
treaties.  Thus the effect of the relief clause and the sections that 
implement it, constitutes a decision by the United States, in light of 
the abrogation clause, to redirect the money originally 
appropriated for fulfilling its obligations under the treaties of 1837 
and 1851 to a new purpose, namely to compensate white victims of 
the war. 
In addition to these relief provisions, the Abrogation Act 
contains three other clauses that disclose three other purposes for 
which the Act also prescribes action: an abrogation clause, a land 
forfeiture clause, and a rescuers clause.  A close examination of the 
texts of these three clauses reveals that the overarching purpose of 
Congress was to banish the Dakota from their ancestral homeland 
within the State of Minnesota. 
 
 38.  Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, §§ 1–8, 10, 12 Stat. 652. 
 39.  Id. § 1, pmbl. 
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1. The Abrogation Clause 
Section 1 states: 
[A]ll treaties heretofore made and entered into by the 
Sisseton, Wahpaton, Medawakanton, and Wahpakoota 
bands of Sioux or Dakota Indians, or any of them, with 
the United States, are hereby declared to be abrogated 
and annulled, so far as said treaties or any of them 
purport to impose any future obligation on the United 
States . . . .40 
This clause contains the only mention of abrogation in the 
Abrogation Act.  No further mention of abrogation is found in any 
other legislation.  Thus, if we take the words of the text literally, it 
seems clear that Congress must have intended the declaration that 
all of the Dakota treaties were null and void would be self-executing 
and would take effect by virtue of the passage of the Abrogation Act 
without the need for further action.  Beyond that, there is no 
mention of the specific “future obligations” of the United States 
that were to be no longer in effect.  For that we have to turn to the 
treaties themselves and to subsequent conduct by the United States. 
The obligations the United States sought to shed included, 
most importantly, promises made under the treaty of 1837 to 
provide an annuity in payment for the land cession and promises 
made under the 1851 treaties to provide cash payments for several 
purposes and an annuity payable for fifty years to help the Dakota 
move to an agricultural-based economy.41 
The interesting point to note here is that, because the United 
States claimed to have shed its treaty obligations to the Dakota by 
virtue of its unilateral abrogation of those treaties, a question arises 
concerning the meaning of the Dakota’s obligations to the United 
States under the treaties after abrogation.  On that score, it seems 
that the conclusion may be that the abrogation clause abrogated all 
obligations undertaken by the terms of the treaties, by both the 
 
 40.  Id. § 1. 
 41.  Treaty with the Sioux––Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands art. 4, July 23, 
1851, 10 Stat. 949 (specifying payments to be made, including an annuity for a 
period of fifty years); Treaty with the Sioux art. 2, Sept. 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 538 
(specifying payments to be made, including an annuity forever); WESTERMAN & 
WHITE, supra note 13, at 159–60 (discussing the 1837 treaty negotiations on the 
annuity).  The Treaty with the Sioux––Mdewakanton and Wahpakoota Bands, 
Aug. 5, 1851, 10 Stat. 954, was modeled on the Treaty with the Sioux––Sisseton 
and Wahpeton Bands, July 23, 1851, 10 Stat. 949, and contained a similar 
provision. 
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United States and the Dakota people.  The unilateral abrogation by 
one party would seem to render the obligations of the other 
treating nation-state(s) no longer in effect as each of such nation-
state(s) so chose.  This makes sense when one considers the fact 
that treaties are acts that are constituted by the exchange of mutual 
promises made through a formal agreement between separate 
sovereign nations.  Once one party to a treaty withdraws from that 
treaty unilaterally, assuming this is possible under the law of 
treaties, there is no reason to assume that the other non-abrogating 
party continues to be bound by the promises it made in the treaty 
now abrogated.  Thus, unless the Dakota people chose to 
unilaterally reaffirm their various grants of permission they gave to 
the United States to enter upon and use Dakota land as specified 
under the terms of the now abrogated treaties, these grants of 
permission are no longer in effect.  Absent such evidence, the 
unilateral abrogation of the treaties by the United States would 
seem to have returned the parties to their statuses prior to the 
treaties taking effect.  In that case, if the Dakota Oyate chose to do 
so, it would appear that they could recover full access to all of the 
twenty-four million acres, which had been “ceded” under the 1851 
and 1858 treaties, as well as land lost under cessions effected by the 
1825 and 1837 treaties.42 
But giving up access to the Dakota land by unilaterally 
abrogating the treaties is not what Congress had in mind when it 
enacted the abrogation clause.  Immediately following the 
abrogation clause in section 1 is the forfeiture clause, which 
purports to transfer all of the Dakota homeland to the United 
States without any compensation to the Dakota from the United 
States.  This action adds a more expansive meaning to the 
abrogation of the treaties set forth above when read in 
combination with the forfeiture clause, to which we now turn. 
2. The Forfeiture Clause 
Section 1 includes a clause that reads: “[A]ll lands and rights 
of occupancy within the State of Minnesota, and all annuities and 
claims heretofore accorded to said Indians, or any of them, [are 
declared] to be forfeited to the United States.”43  This clause does 
two things: it purports to seize the entire Dakota homeland that was 
 
 42.  See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 43.  Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat 652. 
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the subject of the now abrogated treaties, and it affirms the idea 
that the United States intended to shed all of its obligations under 
those treaties, in language that makes clear it would no longer 
honor any claims made upon the United States by the Dakota 
under the terms of the treaties. 
This is the most astounding clause in the Abrogation Act.  It is 
a straightforward and simple statement of what can only be called a 
legislatively sanctioned seizure of the Dakota homeland.  The 
Abrogation Act does not specify the legal basis on which such 
seizure might be based.  This cries out for careful consideration of 
what legal justification, if any, might be offered for such action.  
This we shall undertake in Part III below.  Here we note that this 
appears to be an effort to exercise a claimed plenary power over the 
tribes, a feature that has been a part of federal Indian law for many 
years.  Notwithstanding this longstanding practice by the federal 
government, in Part III we shall reexamine the legal justification, if 
any, for the exercise of such power. 
When considered in the larger context of the long road to war 
and the actions of the United States in the two years following the 
war, the forfeiture clause is nothing less than an act of conquest 
through a continuation of the war after the Dakota forces were 
finally defeated at the Battle of Wood Lake on September 23, 1862.  
In light of this and the story of the long, tortured history of federal 
Indian policy, I am left with the question of why the United States 
ever entered into treaties with the tribes at all, at least after the 
disparity in military power became evident at the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Perhaps it was done for no more than salving the 
conscience of the Americans bent on conquest who might 
otherwise be committed to the idea of the Rule of Law.44  It remains 
 
 44.  The “Rule of Law,” as used here, refers to the idea “embedded in the 
Charter of the United Nations encompass[ing] elements relevant to the conduct 
of State to State relations.”  United Nations and the Rule of Law, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 5, 2012).  
According to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: 
[For the United Nations, the rule of law] refers to a principle of 
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and 
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are 
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, 
and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards.  It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the 
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to 
the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, 
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for us to ask, what further light might be shed on this story by the 
rescuers clause of the Abrogation Act? 
3. The Rescuers Clause 
Section 9 reads that “the Secretary of the Interior is hereby 
authorized to set apart of the public lands, not otherwise 
appropriated, eighty acres in severalty to each individual of the 
before-named bands who exerted himself in rescuing the whites 
from the late massacre of said Indians.”45 
The war split the Dakota tribes.  The Upper tribes (Sisseton 
and Wahpeton) disagreed, for the most part, with Little Crow and 
those who joined him in conducting the war.  Some of them 
resisted the war by (1) directly calling upon Little Crow to cease 
military action, (2) participating in espionage that provided 
valuable information to the state militia assembled hastily to defend 
the settlements, and (3) providing refuge for settler families to 
shield them from the onslaught of the Dakota forces.46  Thus, while 
some Dakota went to war, others provided aid and comfort to the 
settlers.  In neither case can these actions be taken as 
abandonment by the Dakota of their deep connection to the 
homeland.  To the contrary, each action, in its own way, was a 
desperate effort under extremely difficult circumstances to 
maintain that connection. 
The rescuers clause of the Abrogation Act is a specific 
recognition of the debt owed to those friendly Dakota who had 
helped in “rescuing the whites from the late massacre.”47  Literally 
this means the clause applied solely to those friendly Dakota who 
resisted the war through rescue efforts, as opposed to other 
friendly Dakota.  These rescuers would each receive land that was 
described as “eighty acres in severalty” from the “public lands, not 
 
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. 
UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE RULE OF LAW AND 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 4 (2004),           
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF 
/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement. 
 45.  Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, § 9, 12 Stat. 652. 
 46.  Carrie Reber Zeman, Historical Introduction to MARY BUTLER RENVILLE, A 
THRILLING NARRATIVE OF INDIAN CAPTIVITY: DISPATCHES FROM THE DAKOTA WAR 1, 1–
112 (Carrie Reber Zeman & Kathryn Zabelle Deroudian-Stodola eds., 2012). 
 47.  Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, § 9, 12 Stat. 652. 
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otherwise appropriated.”48  Land would be distributed to qualifying 
Dakota rescuers as individual owners of land on which they could 
carry on their lives and could pass on to their heirs “forever.”49  No 
doubt, in this provision Congress had in mind the prospect that 
such landholders either had adopted or would adopt the 
agricultural habits and practices of whites.  Indeed, many of the 
friendly Dakota had in fact already done just that.  Adoption of 
agriculture had long been an important part of the effort to 
separate the Dakota from their homeland as well as part of the 
missionaries’ campaign to convert the Dakota to Christianity.50 
It is very important to note that the land specified by this 
clause for distribution to the Dakota rescuers was to be taken from 
“public lands, not otherwise appropriated” without any specification of 
where that land might be located.  Furthermore, the clause states that 
“[t]he land so set apart shall not be subject to any tax, forfeiture, or 
sale, by process of law, and shall not be aliened or devised, except 
by the consent of the President of the United States.”51  This seems 
to open the possibility, at least theoretically, that land to be 
distributed to the rescuers could be within the borders of 
Minnesota and free of any local taxation.  And while the land so 
distributed could be passed down to the heirs of those who 
qualified as rescuers, they could not, without consent of the 
President, convey the land to anyone other than their heirs.  In 
light of the continuing backlash in Minnesota against all Dakota, 
however, assigning land to the rescuers from land located within 
their ancestral homeland in Minnesota was most unlikely.  From a 
Dakota point of view, Minnesota was now an unsafe place to live.  
What was more likely was that the rescuers would join other Dakota 
on land outside the boundaries of any state as specified in the 
Dakota Removal Act passed on March 3, 1863. 
B. The Dakota Removal Act of 1863 
The Dakota Removal Act, passed on March 3, 1863, a mere 
fifteen days after the Abrogation Act, deals with the status of all 
Dakota people who were not rescuers of white victims.52  The 
Removal Act makes clear that all other friendly Dakota would be 
 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  WINGERD, supra note 4, at 272–73. 
 51.  Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, § 9, 12 Stat. 652. 
 52.  Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 819. 
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forcibly removed to “unoccupied land” at an unspecified location 
“outside of the limits of any state.”53  This unspecified land would 
be paid for out of the proceeds to be collected by the federal 
government from the sale of Dakota land seized in Minnesota.54 
While the provisions of the Removal Act seemed aimed at the 
non-rescuing friendly Dakota people, it is likely that the rescuers 
would join their kinsmen in the reservations yet to be specified 
beyond the borders of the State of Minnesota.  This was likely to 
occur because of the extreme hatred that whites now had for all 
indigenous people, expressed in ongoing demands for more 
executions of convicted warriors.  Retribution against all Dakota 
meant that all of the friendly Dakota, including the rescuers, were 
at risk for outbreaks of mob violence, which the government was 
not in a good position to prevent.  As a result, the Dakota people 
were exiled to an unspecified land that prevented them from 
remaining part of their ancestral homeland, a land that was a 
central component of their individual, collective, and cultural 
identity. 
With the foregoing specific terms of the 1863 Acts in mind, we 
turn now to the most important question concerning their 
implementation, namely: By what legally authorized power, if any, 
did Congress take these actions? 
V. THE CLAIMED LEGAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE                          
1863 ACTS OF CONGRESS 
 The commitment to the Rule of Law as a limit on the exercise 
of government power is a core American commitment that goes 
back to the Declaration of Independence and the indictment it sets 
out against King George as having engaged in a pattern of behavior 
that violated the “unalienable rights” of his subjects in the 
American colonies.  It was this pattern of behavior, above the limits 
of the Rule of Law, which justified that the colonies should be 
“Free and Independent.”55  This is the backdrop against which we 
shall undertake a search for the legal justification, if any, for the 
power exercised by Congress in abrogating the Dakota treaties, 
seizing the Dakota homeland, and forcibly removing the Dakota 
people from their homeland through the 1863 Acts passed in the 
 
 53.  Id. § 1. 
 54.  Id. §§ 3–4. 
 55.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 6 (U.S. 1776). 
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aftermath of the 1862 war.  The discussion is organized around 
three possible sources of legal authorization for the power that 
might be drawn upon to justify these Acts: treaty power, 
constitutional power, and plenary power. 
A. The Treaty Power 
1. International Treaty Law on Unilateral Abrogation 
To understand the legal justification and legal effect of the 
abrogation clause, we shall have to consult both international and 
domestic law.  In turning first to international law, it is important to 
start by noting that treaties are entered into between separate and 
sovereign nations.  Thus, under international treaty law, treaties 
entail mutual recognition of such sovereign status by the respective 
parties to the treaties.  Even though the status of the Indian tribes 
as discreet sovereign nations is limited under domestic American 
law by their status as “domestic dependent nations,”56 such status 
has always included a measure of sovereignty under domestic law.  
This has effectively insulated the tribes in large measure from the 
jurisdiction of the several states of the union on matters occurring 
within tribal jurisdiction on reserved tribal land.57  Thus, even if we 
read the Indian treaties with this limited notion of sovereignty in 
mind, that does not alter the fact that the treaties were entered into 
for the purpose of, and in consideration of, exchanging obligations 
between parties to the treaty.  Why else would the United States 
seek to enter into a treaty with the Dakota people except out of 
recognition that some measure of sovereignty was held by the 
Indian tribes over their land when they met at the treaty-making 
table? 
While unilateral termination of a treaty is frowned upon, 
nation-states (such as the United States) can take such action under 
international treaty law as an internationally recognized aspect of 
their sovereignty.58  Thus, under international law, the abrogation 
clause must be read to have released the United States from its 
treaty obligations to pay cash and provide other support for the 
Dakota under the terms of the 1837 and 1851 treaties.  No doubt, 
the same can be said for the United States’ obligations under all 
 
 56.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
 57.  Id. at 71–72; see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 536 (1832). 
 58.  MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 37–40 (4th ed. 
2003) (discussing unilateral termination). 
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other previous treaties concluded between representatives of the 
Dakota people and the United States from the first treaty of 1805 
up to the February 16, 1863 Abrogation Act. 
2. Domestic American Law on Unilateral Abrogation 
The exercise of unilateral treaty abrogation power is usually 
presumed to be justified, as a matter of domestic law, only when 
circumstances arise that justify the federal government in not 
carrying out its treaty obligations, so as to serve the national 
interest and that of the Indian nations with whom they have 
concluded a particular treaty that is the subject of abrogation 
legislation.  The case most often cited for this proposition is Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock.59  In all cases, clear evidence is required that 
Congress actually considered and acted to abrogate the treaty in 
question.  Thus, in the absence of a clear statement of 
congressional intent to abrogate a treaty, courts have held that 
action that appears to be inconsistent with a treaty does not 
necessarily provide evidence of a clear congressional intent to 
abrogate the treaty.  In such cases, the courts apply the Rules of 
Sympathetic Construction of Indian treaties.  This complex set of 
rules was developed by the courts for the construction of Indian 
treaties when they are the subject of dispute in a court of law in 
order to preserve those rights reserved by tribes in the treaties they 
have entered into with the United States.60  The Rules of 
Sympathetic Construction of Treaties are also applicable to 
abrogation of such treaties.  In some cases, such as the well-known 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,61 the tribes claimed 
that various rights that they reserved under their treaties with the 
United States were not abrogated by virtue of various actions taken 
subsequently by the United States.  In a nutshell, the evidence did 
not demonstrate a clear statement of abrogation.62 
Judge William C. Canby Jr., a leading expert in federal Indian 
law, helpfully identified and summarized the foundational purpose 
of the Rules of Sympathetic Construction of Indian treaties and acts 
 
 59.  187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
 60.  See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 
(1968) (upholding the hunting and fishing rights on reservation land 
notwithstanding the passage of a termination act governing the relationship 
between the United States and the tribe). 
 61.  526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
 62.  Id. at 189–91. 
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of Congress which purport to abrogate them, when he wrote that 
these rules require courts to construe treaties in a way that is 
“sympathetic to Indian interests” in order “[t]o compensate for the 
disadvantage at which the treaty-making process placed the tribes, 
and to help carry out the federal trust responsibility” to the tribes.63  
The rules developed by the courts for application in reading Indian 
treaties, in pursuit of this purpose, are, in turn, based on three core 
principles.  Courts are required to: (1) “look beyond the written 
words to the larger context that frames the Treaty, including ‘the 
history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical 
construction adopted by the parties;’”64 (2) construe the treaties “in 
accordance with the meaning they were understood to have by the 
tribal representatives at the council;”65 and (3) ensure that the 
treaties “are to be liberally interpreted to accomplish their 
protective purposes, with ambiguities . . . resolved in favor of the 
Indians.”66 
These three core principles are recognized by two other 
leading experts on federal Indian law, Charles F. Wilkinson and 
John M. Volkman, in their widely cited article on judicial review of 
Indian treaty abrogation as “canons of construction designed to 
rectify the inequality” in the “bargaining position of the tribes and 
the recognition of the trust relationship” that the federal 
government has with the tribes.67  Wilkinson and Volkman describe 
“[t]hree primary rules.”68  “[A]mbiguous expressions must be 
resolved in favor of the Indian parties concerned.”69  “Indian 
treaties must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have 
 
 63.  WILLIAM C. CANBY JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 122–30 (5th 
ed. 2009). 
 64.  Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 196 (quoting Choctaw 
Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943)). 
 65.  Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942). 
 66.  CANBY, supra note 63, at 122 (citing Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 
(1930)). 
 67.  Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty 
Abrogation: “As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth”—How Long a Time 
is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 617–20 (1975). 
 68.  Id. at 617. 
 69.  Id. (citing McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); 
Carpenter, 280 U.S. at 367; Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908)). 
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understood them.”70  “Indian treaties must be liberally construed in 
favor of the Indians.”71 
Wilkinson and Volkman’s description matches the core 
principles identified by Judge Canby cited above.72  In both cases, 
the rules or canons of construction are rooted in the foundational 
recognition of the disadvantage of the Indians engaged in the 
negotiations at the treaty-making table and try to compensate for 
that in an active way in the judicial interpretation of the treaties 
that were signed there.  It is worth reiterating the words of Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor in her opinion for the Supreme Court in 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, an important 
recent case involving a question of abrogation concerning a treaty 
with the Ojibwe (or Chippewa) people in the State of Minnesota, 
which were quoted by Judge Canby.  In the course of her opinion 
denying that such abrogation had occurred, Justice O’Connor 
wrote that: “[T]o determine whether [the treaty] language [in 
question] abrogates Chippewa Treaty rights, we look beyond the 
written words to the larger context that frames the Treaty, including ‘the 
history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical 
construction adopted by the parties.’”73  Justice O’Connor makes 
clear that the Rules of Sympathetic Construction require that 
courts undertake a contextually sensitive reading of the treaties that 
goes far beyond the mere words of the treaties themselves.  
Furthermore, the specific rules require that, in looking beyond the 
mere words of the treaty to “the larger context that frames the 
treaty,” the courts engage in a reading of the treaty that favors the 
Indian tribes by relying on the understanding of tribal 
representatives, rather than simply on the traditional Anglo-
American understanding of such things within the tradition of 
Anglo-American real property law.  This is important when there is 
no explicit abrogation.  In the case of the Dakota treaties, however, 
there is an explicit statement of abrogation—as we have seen in the 
abrogation clause of the Abrogation Act of 1863.  Unless we seek to 
 
 70.  Id. (citing Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); 
United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Starr v. Long Jim, 227 
U.S. 613, 622–23 (1913); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832)). 
 71.  Id. (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943); 
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684–85 (1942); United States v. Walker River 
Irrig. Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 1939)). 
 72.  See supra text accompanying notes 63–66. 
 73.  Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 
(1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 432). 
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limit the application of this clause by claiming that “all” in the 
phrase “all treaties” should only apply to the hostile Dakota, it 
would seem that the friendly Dakota are also included in the 
sweeping abrogation statement.  Indeed, the postwar backlash 
against all Dakota indicates as much.  Furthermore, to the extent 
that the United States sought to ameliorate the impact of the 
abrogation, it appears to have done this by virtue of the 
establishment of reservations and the later purchase of land in 
Minnesota for the four federally recognized communities currently 
in existence in the state.  In making these observations, I am not 
arguing against an effort to restrict the scope of the abrogation 
clause.  Rather, I am simply trying to suggest the arguments that 
might be made by the United States against any such efforts. 
B. Constitutional Power over Indian Affairs 
It is a fundamental tenet of American constitutional law that 
all power of government comes from the people, who are 
sovereign.  What power the federal government does have is 
limited to what has been delegated to it from the sovereign people 
through the Constitution.74  The purpose of this delegation of 
power to the government is to promote the people’s freedom.  
Such power is either enumerated in the text of the Constitution or 
implied from the text.  In either case, the specific contours and 
limits of power are derived from the text of the Constitution.  
Beyond the simple notion that the government can only exercise 
those powers that were delegated to it by the Constitution, the core 
idea that government is limited is expressed in two other ways.  The 
first is the complex system of checks and balances between the 
various branches of the federal government and the division of 
power between the federal and state governments.  The second is 
the commitment to a set of enumerated rights of the people that 
precede the Constitution.  These core features of the Constitution 
reflect the deep American commitment to organizing and 
operating the government of the people under the Rule of Law 
noted earlier.75 
 
 74.  The classic statement of these core features of the Constitution are set 
out in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 75.  See supra text accompanying note 55. 
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In light of this fundamental feature of American constitutional 
government, it is always appropriate to ask, when Congress acts, 
whether the action taken is constitutionally authorized.  If it is not, the 
action taken is beyond the scope of power delegated to Congress by 
the people and thus is unconstitutional and void.76  Therefore, it is 
appropriate for us to ask whether the congressional Acts of 1863 
are authorized under the Constitution. 
Mark Savage, in an article entitled Native Americans and the 
Constitution: The Original Understanding, has made an exhaustive 
inquiry into the question of what power has been delegated to the 
federal government with respect to Indigenous tribes located 
within the boundaries of the United States.77  He begins by noting: 
[A] resplendent multitude of federal statutes and an 
august line of opinions by the Supreme Court of the 
United States declare that the Constitution bestows . . . 
plenary power to legislate the form of government of 
Native Americans[;] . . . to determine whether a “tribe” 
does or does not exist and whether a Native American is 
or is not a citizen of it[;] to control property rights and 
relations of Native Americans[; and that t]he power of 
Congress can reach all social, cultural, economic, 
political, and personal facets of Native Americans’ lives.78 
A particularly disturbing example of the breathtaking scope of the 
plenary power of Congress to regulate what might otherwise be 
regarded as property rights is a case decided only fifty-eight years 
ago, in 1955, when the Court upheld the plenary power of the 
United States to take and extinguish title to tribal land without 
giving any compensation in return.79  Noting that even the 
conferral of citizenship on Native Americans by the United States 
did not give rise to limits on this plenary power, Mark Savage 
declares: “The truth . . . is stranger than fiction: The Constitution 
never conferred such power over Native Americans.  Two hundred 
years of decisions by the Supreme Court and legislation by 
Congress and the President lack constitutional authority.”80 
The assertion by the federal government of wide-ranging 
power over virtually all aspects of the life and relations of the 
 
 76.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
 77.  Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original 
Understanding, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57 (1991). 
 78.  Id. at 59–60 (citations omitted). 
 79.  See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
 80.  Savage, supra note 77, at 60 (emphasis added).  
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Indian tribes has a long history, despite the fact that there is not a 
shred of evidence to support a grant of such power to the 
government as required by the Constitution.  Thus, unless some 
source of law can be found to justify the exercise of such power, all 
of the actions the United States has taken over the last two 
centuries under such assumed power are without legal foundation 
under the Constitution.  As such, it rests on nothing more than 
legislative and judicial fiat that undermines the American 
commitment to the Rule of Law. 
Savage reaches this conclusion after searching the text and 
history of the adoption of the Constitution.  In so doing, he points 
out that only two provisions of the original Constitution address 
relations with “Indians” and the “Indian tribes.”  The first instance 
is the Three-Fifths Clause of Article I.81  The second is the Indian 
Commerce Clause, also in Article I.82  The Three-Fifths Clause deals 
with counting the population for the purpose of representation in 
the House of Representatives and direct taxation.  After searching 
the records of the Constitutional Convention, Savage concludes 
that it does not grant any power to Congress over Indian affairs, 
although “[i]t implies that states had some power to tax individual 
Native Americans.”83  In the case of the Indian Commerce Clause, 
Savage concludes that “the national legislative power is limited to 
commerce with Native American tribes, and extends no further.”84 
Having searched the records of the Constitutional Convention 
for the purpose of determining the meaning of the text of the 
Three-Fifths and Indian Commerce Clauses that do mention 
Indians, Savage goes on to explore a number of arguments that 
might be made to derive the plenary power of Congress over 
Indian affairs as an implied power from the entire text of the 
Constitution.  In doing so he searches from the records of colonial 
America’s dealings with Native Americans that pre-date the 
 
 81.  The Three-Fifths Clause reads as follows: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole 
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of 
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 82.  The Indian Commerce Clause reads as follows: “[Congress shall have 
power to] regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes.”  Id. § 8, cl. 3. 
 83.  Savage, supra note 77, at 72. 
 84.  Id. at 78–79. 
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Constitution to the arguments in The Federalist Papers written in 
support of ratification of the Constitution.  But that too, he 
demonstrates, is to no avail.85  Thus, he concludes: 
The United States—its President, its Congress, and its 
Supreme Court—can exercise no power over Native 
Americans unless the Constitution grants it.  Examination 
of the text of the Constitution, the intentions of the 
Framers, contemporary notions about sovereignty, the 
records of the Continental Congress, and contemporary 
treaties with Native American nations makes it clear that 
the Constitution has never granted to the United States a 
plenary power over Native Americans.86 
Savage closes his article by asking: “What then shall we do?”  He 
answers: 
First, we can prevent with national legislation any further 
contravention of and disrespect of Native Americans’ 
territorial and personal sovereignty.  We can confess the 
fallacy of a policy grounded in “manifest destiny,” and we 
can change it.  At this point, it is the least we can do. 
Secondly, a process must be jointly designed by which to 
decide how to remedy this unjust and unconstitutional 
situation. . . . 
Finally, advocates for Native Americans can use the 
research and argument [set out in this article] in the 
courts, to challenge exercises of state and federal power 
over Native Americans and their lands and thus to 
accomplish the ends of self-determination and self-
government.87 
If we take Savage’s proposal that “[w]e . . . confess the fallacy 
of a policy grounded in ‘manifest destiny’”88 as a first step in taking 
action to change it, we need to tell the full truth about the plenary 
power and its foundation in the Doctrine of Discovery.  It is to that 
task that we now turn. 
C. Plenary Power as an Expression of the Doctrine of Christian Discovery 
In the absence of any constitutional warrant for the plenary 
power, we must ask: What other source of law, beyond the 
 
 85.  Id. at 87–115. 
 86.  Id. at 115–16. 
 87.  Id. at 118. 
 88.  Id. 
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss2/5
  
568 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:2 
Constitution, could possibly serve as the warrant for United States 
seizure of the Dakota lands and the forcible removal of the Dakota 
people from that land in the aftermath of the 1862 war? 
One of the sources referred to by the Court in the cases 
affirming plenary power is the five-hundred-year-old Doctrine of 
Discovery89 as incorporated into domestic American law by Chief 
Justice Marshall in three cases known as the “Marshall Trilogy.”90  
These three cases are universally regarded as the foundation of 
federal Indian law.  By examining the Discovery Doctrine in its 
American incarnation, we shall see that it is what ultimately lies 
behind the forfeiture and forced removal clauses of the 
congressional response to the demand for extermination or 
removal of the Dakota people from Minnesota in the aftermath of 
the 1862 war.  If the Discovery Doctrine, as the foundation of these 
congressional acts, cannot be justified any more than we can find 
textual warrant for these acts within the Constitution, then both of 
the 1863 Acts are without foundation and ultra vires.91 
To explore the American incarnation of the Discovery 
Doctrine we need to turn first to its origin in fifteenth-century 
Europe.  The European version of this doctrine was developed to 
serve the imperial interests of the Christian European nations that 
launched an aggressive campaign of discovery and conquest in the 
fifteenth century.  This campaign sparked disputes between 
Western European nations as they raced each other to expand 
their empires on land being “discovered” far from Europe.  The 
origin of the doctrine is found in a series of fifteenth-century Papal 
Bulls.  Two are of special importance: Romanus Pontifex, issued by 
Pope Nicholas V in 1455, and Inter caetera divinai, issued by Pope 
Alexander VI in 1493 written after the “discovery of America” by 
Christopher Columbus.  The Papal Bulls, as well as other 
documents drafted to facilitate European discovery and dominion 
 
 89.  For an extended discussion of the origin of the Doctrine of Discovery 
and its role in the legal image of Native Americans, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., 
THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 13–50 (1990).  For a discussion 
of ten characteristics of the Doctrine of Discovery, including the assumed 
preeminence of the Christian European Nations and the United States and how 
they played an important role in the westward expansion of the United States that 
came to be rationalized through “Manifest Destiny,” see ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE 
AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS AND CLARK, AND 
MANIFEST DESTINY 3–10, 12–23, 25–58, 115–61 (2008). 
 90.  See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
 91.  Savage, supra note 77, at 82. 
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over foreign lands, were predicated on the assumed superiority and 
preeminence of the Catholic Church as the universal authority for 
governance of the world.  In particular, they were also based, in 
part, on Pope Innocent IV’s thirteenth-century legal commentary 
on an earlier decree by Pope Innocent III justifying the Christian 
Crusades undertaken between 1096 and 1271.92  Inter caetera divinai 
is the Papal Bull most often cited as the origin of the Discovery 
Doctrine.  It divided the earth’s continents between Portugal and 
Spain to prevent competition between their respective imperial 
activities.  Under this Papal Bull, nearly all of the Americas were 
granted to Spain.  It “called for non-Christian ‘barbarous nations’ 
to be subjugated and proselytized for the ‘propagation of the 
Christian empire.’”93 
The Discovery Doctrine facilitated the spread of Christian 
European dominion over land where such dominion had not 
previously existed by laying down the principle that once dominion 
was established by one Christian nation over such lands, no other 
Christian nation could exercise the same right.  Thus, in an 
important sense, the Doctrine of Discovery was about regulating 
relations between Western Christian European nations as much as it 
described the relations between these nations and the Indigenous 
peoples they encountered as a result of their imperial discovery 
 
 92.  In addition to the Papal Bulls, calling on the western Christian nations to 
go out and subdue and reduce to slavery the “barbarous inhabitants of foreign 
lands,” other documents played an important role in the creation and justification 
of the Discovery Doctrine.  For example, in 1513, Spain created the notorious 
“Requerimiento,” a document that was subsequently read out loud by Spanish 
conquistadors when they encountered the Indigenous peoples in the Americas 
upon landing in their land on a “discovery” voyage.  The document purported, as 
a matter of law, to provide justification for enslavement of the Indigenous people 
to whom this document was read if they did not accept the pre-eminence of the 
Catholic Church and the Pope, along with the dominion of the Spanish Crown, a 
Christian head of state of a Christian nation, to whom God had given the power to 
rule over others.  The last paragraph of the Requerimiento warns that if the 
Indigenous people did not comply, they would be subjected to war aimed at 
forcibly bringing about their enslavement and dispossession of their families and 
property.  The Requerimiento and the other documents alluded to here are 
available at The Doctrine of Discovery, EPISCOPAL STUDY GROUP, http://                  
www .doctrineofdiscovery.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
 93.  EXECUTIVE COMM., WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, STATEMENT ON THE 
DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY AND ITS ENDURING IMPACT ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ¶ 6 
(Feb. 17, 2012) [hereinafter WCC STATEMENT] (quoting Pope Alexander VI), 
available at http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/executive          
-committee/bossey-february-2012/statement-on-the-doctrine-of-discovery-and-its    
-enduring-impact-on-indigenous-peoples.html. 
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activities.  With respect to the Indigenous peoples so 
encountered—understood from a European perspective—the 
doctrine authorized the “discovering” Christian nations to exercise 
dominion over them and their lands by virtue of what came to be 
viewed as the theologically sanctioned conquest of the non-Christian 
inhabitants found in the new lands.  Discovery and conquest went 
hand in hand, laying a theologically supported legal foundation for 
the spread of the European empire across the earth.  Thus, the 
Discovery Doctrine provided the basis for Spanish, Dutch, French, 
and English land claims in North America and for carving up the 
“discovered” land between these European sovereign powers, all of 
whom at one time or another established settlements in North 
America to perfect their claim to the land they “discovered” there.  
Eventually, as these European powers were supplanted in North 
America by the new American republic in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, the doctrine was embraced as legal 
precedent within the domestic law of the United States.  Today, it 
continues to function as the foundation of federal Indian law.94 
The Doctrine of Discovery became incorporated in a 
distinctive way into the domestic law of the United States through 
the three early nineteenth-century cases decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court that are collectively referred to as the “Marshall 
Trilogy.”95  In broad terms, these cases hold that the sovereignty 
and property rights of the Indigenous peoples are limited.  In the 
first of these cases, Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice John Marshall, 
writing for the Court, held that, while native peoples residing in 
their homelands within the expanding territorial boundaries of the 
United States had the right to use and occupy these lands, they no 
longer had the power to convey title to them.96  That title now 
rested in the United States and in any of its successors to whom the 
land might have been transferred or sold under established 
principles of real property law imported to the United States from 
England.  In the two cases that followed, in 1831 and 1832, the 
Court defined Indian nations as “domestic dependent nations,” 
captive within the territorial boundaries of the United States,97 and 
able to exercise a limited amount of sovereignty with which the 
 
 94.  MILLER, supra note 89, at 56–58. 
 95.  See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 96.  21 U.S. 543, 573–74 (1823). 
 97.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
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individual states could not interfere.98  Collectively these cases also 
held that while the “Indian nations” had some limited sovereignty 
to govern affairs on the land on which they resided, without 
interference from the states, they did so at the pleasure of, and 
subject to, the plenary power of Congress.99  Thus, Congress could, 
if it so chose, have the last word on how affairs were to be governed 
within the communities of Indian nations on their homelands. 
The foregoing summary of the holdings in the Marshall 
Trilogy is the conventional understanding that is in effect today.100  
But close examination of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in 
Johnson reveals that it is not so simple.  Mark Savage’s search of the 
historical background leading up to the Constitutional Convention 
in 1787, especially including the records of the Continental 
Congress that predate the Convention, clearly reveal the fact that 
both the colonies and the young republic viewed Native Americans 
as sovereign and in full possession of their property rights.101  Thus, 
prior to the Marshall Trilogy, the tribes were considered sovereign 
on their own lands vis-à-vis the United States, and any desire by the 
United States to secure access for use or outright ownership of what 
were understood to be Indian lands could only be accomplished by 
purchase or through war as an act of conquest.102  It stretches the 
imagination to think that Chief Justice Marshall was unaware of this 
history, given his role in the formation of the republic, when he 
wrote his opinion in Johnson.  Nevertheless, in dealing with what 
was basically a real property issue between non-Indians, in which he 
had a personal stake,103 he undertook a wide-ranging discussion of 
the Discovery Doctrine and incorporated a broad reading of it into 
domestic law.  Thus, in Johnson, he observed: 
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great 
nations of Europe were eager to appropriate to 
themselves so much of it as they could respectively 
acquire. . . .  But, as they were all in pursuit of nearly the 
same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting 
settlements, and consequent war with each other, to 
 
 98.  See id. 
 99.  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 558–61 (1832) (holding that Georgia 
law is inapplicable to Indian tribes). 
 100.  See, e.g., CANBY, supra note 63, at 15–19. 
 101.  See Savage, supra note 77, at 96–103. 
 102.  See id. at 105. 
 103.  See LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF 
AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 86–89 (2005). 
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establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the 
law by which the right of acquisition, which they all 
asserted, should be regulated as between themselves.  This 
principle was, that discovery gave title to the government 
by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, 
against all other European governments, which title might 
be consummated by possession.104 
In taking this view, to decide the case as Chief Justice Marshall did, 
he set out what has become the foundation for the understanding 
of the relation between the tribes and the United States in federal 
Indian law up to the present day. 
It bears repeating here that the primary purpose of the 
Discovery Doctrine, as developed in Europe, was to regulate the 
relations between the European nations engaged in discovery far 
from Europe.  But in Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall used the 
doctrine primarily to describe the relation between the tribes and 
the United States, rather than to regulate the relation between the 
United States and other nation-states with whom it might be in 
competition for foreign land in the expansion of empire.  
Moreover, he used the Discovery Doctrine, in Johnson, for the 
purpose of settling a real property dispute between non-Indians, in 
which he had a personal interest that could have been settled on 
real property legal grounds.105  Not only is this arguably a departure 
from international practice, it is a clear departure from American 
colonial practice and from that of the young republic in the early 
years after its formation at the conventions that adopted first the 
Articles of Confederation in 1781 and later the Constitution in 
1787. 
The narrow reading of the Discovery Doctrine that pertained in 
the colonies and the young republic prior to Johnson v. M’Intosh is 
located in its origin as an early expression of the law of nations as 
applied to relations between the Christian Nations of Western Europe.  
Under such a reading, the Discovery Doctrine gives the 
“discovering” nation no more than a preemptive right, over other 
European nations, to purchase the land of the Indigenous peoples, 
rather than outright title to that land.  As such, it also respects a 
 
 104.  Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823). 
 105.  ROBERTSON, supra note 103, at 75–76 (noting alternative grounds that 
could have been the sole basis for deciding the case without involving the 
Discovery Doctrine); id. at 86–89 (discussing Marshall’s personal interest in the 
case); id. at 95–116 (discussing Marshall’s construction of the ruling and rationale 
in the case). 
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more robust view of the retained sovereignty of the Indigenous 
peoples. 
Severing title from the Indigenous people, as an aspect of 
application of the broad reading of the Discovery Doctrine as 
incorporated in domestic American law by Chief Justice Marshall, 
has been sharply criticized as a mistake by Lindsay Robertson, in his 
exhaustive and definitive study of Johnson v. M’Intosh and its judicial 
legacy.106  Robertson argues that the better reading of the case, 
especially in the context of Chief Justice Marshall’s clarification of 
the Discovery Doctrine as domestic law in Worcester v. Georgia, is one 
in which the Discovery Doctrine is read as sorting out, as between 
competing claims of nation-states, which of them has a prescriptive 
right to choose to purchase the land of the Indigenous peoples that 
had been “discovered” by one or more of these competing 
European nation-states.  Thus, what the United States gained was 
the prescriptive right to choose to purchase the lands of the Native 
American peoples.  It is a mistake to say that the United States 
gained outright title to these lands.  Robertson goes on to show 
that Chief Justice Marshall himself seems to have recognized that 
he went too far in Johnson.  Thus, in Worcester v. Georgia, Chief 
Justice Marshall backtracked from the view that title was severed 
from the tribe and went to the discovering nation, the position he 
had taken in Johnson.  In Worcester, he rejected the idea that title in 
the Indigenous people was extinguished by discovery, in effect 
acknowledging that in Johnson he had read the Doctrine of 
Discovery too broadly.  His revised view, as stated below, “would 
dismantle the discovery doctrine by overruling that part of the 
doctrine assigning fee title to the discovering sovereign.”107  Chief 
Justice Marshall quoted his statement in Johnson “that discovery 
gave title to the government by whose subjects or by whose 
authority it was made, against all other European governments, 
which title might be consummated by possession.”108  Immediately 
thereafter, Chief Justice Marshall stated: 
This principle, acknowledged by all Europeans, because it 
was the interest of all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation 
making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the 
sole right of acquiring the soil and of making settlements 
 
 106.  See id. at 133–35. 
 107.  Id. at 133. 
 108.  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 543–44 (1832) (quoting Johnson, 21 
U.S. at 573). 
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on it.  It was an exclusive principle which shut out the 
right of competition among those who had agreed to it; 
not one which could annul the previous rights of those 
who had not agreed to it.  It regulated the right given by 
discovery among the European discoverers; but could not 
affect the rights of those already in possession, either as 
aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a 
discovery made before the memory of man.  It gave the 
exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that right 
on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell.109 
Despite Chief Justice Marshall’s correction in Worcester of the 
principle he laid down in Johnson, the Court has ignored the 
correction following Chief Justice Marshall’s death and up to the 
present day.  Instead, the Court has consistently applied the broad 
view of the Discovery Doctrine that Chief Justice Marshall set out in 
Johnson to uphold the broad plenary power of Congress to exercise 
virtually unlimited regulation of the terms of existence and 
activities of the tribes.110 
Today, we need to forthrightly recognize the fact that Chief 
Justice Marshall’s original view that discovery severed title and 
placed it in the United States is an unnecessarily overbroad reading 
of Johnson that should be abandoned.  The harmful effect of the 
broad view of plenary power that it purportedly supports was 
harmful to the Dakota people in the nineteenth century and 
continues to be harmful today—notwithstanding the success of 
many lawyers to secure some measure of protection for the 
sovereignty of the tribes and some measure of benefit for the tribes 
by virtue of the principles attributed to the Marshall Trilogy.  As 
Robert Williams, Jr. and others have pointed out, these benefits are 
always at risk in the face of the continued existence of the plenary 
power of Congress.111  If Congress wanted to terminate some or all 
of the benefits that have been secured by tribes in recent years, as 
well as terminating the tribes themselves, the plenary power, as 
conventionally understood today, would appear to support such 
action.112 
 
 109.  Worcester, 31 U.S. at 544.  
 110.  See ROBERTSON, supra note 103, at 117–34. 
 111.  ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, 
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 71–83 (2005); see also 
CANBY, supra note 63, at 99–101. 
 112.  See WILLIAMS, supra note 111, at 82–83; see also CANBY, supra note 63, at 99–
101. 
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D. Rethinking the Foundation of Federal Indian Law: Repudiating the 
Doctrine of Discovery in Service of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Steven Newcomb’s analysis of the religious roots of the Doctrine 
of Discovery in his book entitled Pagans in the Promised Land: 
Decoding the Doctrine of Christian Discovery113 takes the critique of the 
doctrine further than what we have explored so far.  He goes to the 
very root of the doctrine to emphasize its theological 
underpinnings by pointing out that a good deal of Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in Johnson turns on repeated references to the 
distinction he makes between “Christians” and “heathens.”114  This, 
Newcomb argues, is often overlooked by those who view the 
contemporary understanding of the Discovery Doctrine as being 
secular in character.115  The continued adherence to the doctrine 
by the Court also overlooks this fact.  The truth shows that what 
occurred, both in the aftermath of the Dakota-U.S. War of 1862 
and the treaty-making years that led up to it, is deeply rooted in 
stereotypes of Indigenous peoples as “savage,” “primitive,” and 
“heathen,” all of which resonate with the theological underpinning 
of the broad reading of the Discovery Doctrine.  That broad 
reading supports the exercise by Congress of its plenary power in 
seizing the Dakota land and forcibly removing them from that land.  
If we are to take seriously the possibility of abandoning the 
Discovery Doctrine as one step toward dismantling the plenary 
power of Congress over Indian affairs today, we need to take the 
theological character of the doctrine into account. 
In fact, that is exactly what several religious bodies that have 
begun to repudiate the Discovery Doctrine are now doing.  For 
example, the World Council of Churches (“WCC”) Executive 
Committee noted that the Papal Bulls, on which the Discovery 
Doctrine is based, “called for non-Christian peoples to be invaded, 
captured, vanquished, subdued, reduced to perpetual slavery and 
to have their possessions and property seized by Christian 
monarchs.”116  The WCC Executive Committee went on to point 
out: 
 
 113.  STEVEN T. NEWCOMB, PAGANS IN THE PROMISED LAND: DECODING THE 
DOCTRINE OF CHRISTIAN DISCOVERY (2008). 
 114.  Id. at 85–102. 
 115.  Id. at 139 n.3.  Thus, despite Newcomb’s deep appreciation for Robert 
Williams, Jr.’s work on the Discovery Doctrine, Newcomb criticizes Williams’s 
characterization of the Discovery Doctrine as a secular doctrine.  Id. 
 116.  WCC STATEMENT, supra note 93, ¶ 3. 
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[T]he current situation of Indigenous Peoples around the 
world is the result of a linear programme of legal 
precedent, originating with the Doctrine of Discovery and 
codified in contemporary national laws and policies.  The 
Doctrine mandated Christian European countries to 
attack, enslave and kill the Indigenous Peoples they 
encountered and to acquire all of their assets.  The 
Doctrine remains the law in various ways in almost all 
settler societies around the world today.117 
In light of this history, the WCC Executive Committee 
“[d]enounce[d] the Doctrine of Discovery as fundamentally 
opposed to the gospel of Jesus Christ and as a violation of the 
inherent human rights that all individuals and peoples have 
received from God.”118  In repudiating the Doctrine of Discovery, 
the WCC Executive Committee called on governments to 
“dismantle the legal structures and policies based on [it] . . . .”119  In 
taking this position, the WCC Executive Committee noted that, in 
recent years, the Discovery Doctrine has been repudiated by other 
religious bodies in Western Christianity, including the Episcopal 
Diocese of Maine, Episcopal Diocese of Central New York, 
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends 
(Quaker), the Episcopal Church at its 76th General Convention, 
and the General Synod of the Anglican Church of Canada.120  
Other religious bodies continue to consider taking similar action.  
In July 2012, the New York Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society 
of Friends (Quaker), which is made up of Quaker meetings in New 
York State, northern New Jersey, and southern Connecticut, 
approved a minute to formally repudiate the Doctrine of Discovery 
at its annual Summer Sessions.121 
The “gospel of Jesus Christ”, cited by the WCC Executive 
Committee in its repudiation of the Doctrine of Discovery,122 is 
stated most simply in the Gospel According to Mark: “The time is 
fulfilled, and the kingdom of God has come near; repent, and 
 
 117.  Id. ¶ 6. 
 118.  Id. ¶ 7, pt. A. (The source cited has two parts “A.”  The citation here is to 
the second one.) 
 119.  Id. ¶ 7, pt. B. 
 120.  Id. ¶ 6. 
 121.  The Religious Society of Friends (Quaker), Minutes of the 317th New 
York Yearly Meeting (July 22–28, 2012), http://www.nyym.org/?q=ym 
_2012summin#thurs. 
 122.  WCC STATEMENT, supra note 93, ¶ 7, pt. A (denouncing the Doctrine of 
Discovery). 
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believe in the good news.”123  In this simple statement, and in its 
elaboration in the parables and teachings of Jesus, one will search 
in vain for any call to embark on imperial conquests such as those 
carried out under the Doctrine of Discovery.  To the contrary, 
Jesus’ teaching stands more as a challenge than as a sanction for 
such adventures by nations.  In declaring that the kingdom of God 
is already imminent and constantly breaking open, Jesus makes 
clear that what some might be seeking is already at hand.  Thus, he 
calls those who hear him to “repent.”  The English word “repent,” 
chosen to translate the Greek word metanoia, does not fully capture 
the meaning of Jesus’ call, as it is understood in the Greek word 
found in the Greek New Testament of the Bible.  Taking the 
meaning of the Greek word metanoia into account reveals that Jesus 
is calling those who hear him to transform their minds in order to see 
with different eyes than they have in the past, and in so doing to 
recognize that what they seek is already at hand and even “among” 
them.124  Further illustration of what it means to change one’s mind 
is found in what is perhaps the most well-known of Jesus’ parables: 
the Parable of the Good Samaritan.  After being asked by a lawyer, 
“[W]hat must I do to inherit eternal life?,” Jesus answered with the 
Great Commandment: “You shall love the Lord your God with all 
your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and 
with all your mind; and your neighbor as yourself.”125  Jesus goes on 
to tell the Parable of the Good Samaritan, the story of a stranger 
coming to the rescue of a wounded man lying along the wayside, to 
give an example of what it means to follow this commandment in 
everyday life.  How the core teaching of Jesus, briefly described 
here, could possibly support the Doctrine of Discovery is a question 
to be taken seriously today by all for whom the Christian tradition is 
dear. 
It may seem odd to find a theological reflection, however brief, 
in an article about the law.  But it is important to note that the 
 
 123.  Mark 1:15 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard 
Version). 
 124.  “The kingdom of God is not coming with things that can be observed; 
nor will they say, ‘Look, here it is!’ or ‘There it is!’  For, in fact, the kingdom of 
God is among you.”  Luke 17:20–21 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible: New 
Revised Standard Version).  
 125.  Luke 10:25–37 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard 
Version).  The “Great Commandment” appears throughout the teachings of Jesus.  
Most often, the citation given for it appears in Matthew 22:37–39 (The New Oxford 
Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard Version), where Jesus identifies it as the 
Great Commandment. 
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Doctrine of Discovery is deeply rooted in the Christian religious 
vision of fifteenth-century European Christendom.  The claimed 
superiority and preeminence of Christianity justified, for 
Christendom, the invasion of Indigenous lands and the 
enslavement of Indigenous peoples.  Today many who claim the 
heritage of the Church are emphatically repudiating the Discovery 
Doctrine as a violation of the tradition they hold dear.  Thus, in the 
absence of such repudiation by the secular courts of today, the 
theological mistake of fifteenth-century Christendom is 
perpetuated in the unchallenged incorporation of the Discovery 
Doctrine in Johnson v. M’Intosh that is regarded today as the 
cornerstone of Federal Indian Law. 
The repudiation of the Doctrine of Discovery by religious 
organizations comports with the international recognition of the 
human rights of Indigenous peoples and the central importance of 
land in that recognition, as set out in the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.126  In light of these emerging 
statements, and in the absence of any constitutional foundation for 
the plenary power doctrine and for the Discovery Doctrine on 
which it is founded, further adherence to these doctrines as a 
matter of law by domestic courts in the United States is both a legal 
embarrassment as well as a theological embarrassment.  Legally, it 
is a profound contradiction of the American commitment to the 
Rule of Law.  Theologically, it is a profound contradiction of the 
Church’s commitment to the gospel of Jesus.  In a nation that 
prides itself as committed to the Rule of Law, the Discovery 
Doctrine is nothing more than a judicial fiat with religious 
overtones.  In the context of the journey of this article to the root 
of the Discovery Doctrine, the action taken by Congress to seize the 
Dakota lands and forcibly remove the Dakota people from that 
land in the aftermath of the 1862 war is revealed as nothing more 
than legislative fiat without legal foundation. 
 
 126.  U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 
arts. 3–7, 10, 26–28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/471355a82.html (adopted by the General 
Assembly in 2007; articles 3 through 7 address indigenous peoples’ self-
determination, article 10 addresses them not being subject to forcible relocation 
from their lands, and articles 26 through 28 address their rights to their lands). 
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VI. CONCLUSION: TRUTH TELLING ON THE ROAD TO 
REPARATIONS—THE NEXT STEPS 
The 1863 Acts of Congress, seizing the land of the Dakota and 
forcibly removing them from that land, like the foundation of 
federal Indian law, ultimately rests on the cornerstone of the 
Doctrine of Christian Discovery—a cornerstone that is without 
moral or legal justification.  If we are truthful about this, we need 
to confess that this doctrine, and its continued vitality today, 
disfigures the lives of many people, especially the Dakota, at the 
same time that it disfigures and violates the core purpose of the 
enterprise we call the Rule of Law.  This legacy of trauma, which 
continues to be perpetuated through federal Indian policy, is 
rooted in the American incorporation and expansion of the 
Doctrine of Discovery as a means of conquest and expansion of the 
territory of the United States.  As such, it is an example of a legal 
doctrine that does not serve the higher purposes of law to secure 
justice.  The courts have been active participants in this for too 
long.  But the reform of American law that is needed is not 
something that should be simply left up to the courts.  The 
Doctrine of Discovery, and all that it fosters, needs to be repudiated 
and abandoned through words backed up by concrete deeds of 
reparative justice that can bring healing to the trauma of America’s 
past.  This will require active commitment by all Americans to 
undertake imaginative and innovative initiatives to deal with the 
truth of this troubling past and the need for reparations to address 
the horrific legacy that it has left us with today.  Only then will it be 
possible to write a new, more hopeful American story that might yet 
lead us to a shared future in which all life may flourish.  The first 
step to be taken on the road to reparative justice is truth-telling 
about America’s original sin and the role it has and continues to 
play in the story of Minnesota as well as the nation.127 
In recent years, signs of the needed truth-telling have 
appeared.  The Dakota Commemorative Marches of the Twenty-
First Century, held every two years since 2002, retrace the route of 
 
 127.  WAZIYATAWIN, WHAT DOES JUSTICE LOOK LIKE?: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
LIBERATION IN DAKOTA HOMELAND 167–74 (2008).  The importance of truth-telling 
through honest recognition of the trauma rooted in the past but still felt today is 
discussed at length in DONALD W. SHRIVER JR., AN ETHIC FOR ENEMIES: FORGIVENESS 
IN POLITICS (1995) and DONALD W. SHRIVER JR., HONEST PATRIOTS: LOVING A 
COUNTRY ENOUGH TO REMEMBER ITS MISDEEDS (2005). 
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the forced march of 1862.128  These marches are a Dakota effort to 
remember and heal the enduring trauma that is the legacy of the 
long pattern of action by the United States to separate the Dakota 
from their homeland through a program of ethnic cleansing of 
genocidal proportion.129  The marches bring to public attention the 
injustice the Dakota have experienced in the past as well as the 
trauma they carry today.  With the coming of the war’s 
sesquicentennial in 2012, evidence of truth-telling has appeared 
through the efforts of the descendants of the Dakota who first 
experienced the trauma and through a growing number of non-
Dakota allies.  These groups are looking for a way forward that 
might lead to writing a new, more hopeful chapter in Minnesota 
history.  For example, on August 16, 2012, on the occasion of the 
150th anniversary of the war, Minnesota Governor Mark Dayton 
issued a statement in which he expressly repudiated former 
Governor Ramsey’s call for extermination.130  Two days later, on 
August 18, 2012, the Indigenous spiritual leader Arvol Looking 
Horse led a formal “re-entry of the homeland” by Dakota people 
who crossed back into Minnesota from the west.131  These and other 
initiatives132 support the ongoing efforts of the Dakota people to 
reclaim, recover, and restore their deep relationship with Mni Sota 
Makoce—the homeland.  The time has come for non-Dakota 
 
 128.  See IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF OUR ANCESTORS: THE DAKOTA COMMEMORATIVE 
MARCHES OF THE  21ST CENTURY (Waziyatawin Angela Wilson ed., 2006).  For a 
compelling call for such truth-telling by a Dakota historian in the context of the 
experience of the Dakota people, see WAZIYATAWIN, supra note 127, at 71–94.  For 
a suggestion of how the Talking Circle process, a form of Restorative Justice 
practice, might be employed to engage in truth-telling about the trauma of 
America’s past in its dealings with Indigenous people in general and the Dakota 
people in particular, see Howard J. Vogel, Healing the Trauma of America’s Past: 
Restorative Justice, Honest Patriotism, and the Legacy of Ethnic Cleansing, 55 BUFF. L. 
REV. 981, 1038–39 (2007). 
 129.  Waziyatawin Angela Wilson, Decolonizing the 1862 Death Marches, in IN THE 
FOOTSTEPS OF OUR ANCESTORS, supra note 128, at 43, 49–54.  For an extended 
discussion of how the actions of the United States against the Dakota people meet 
the international law definition of genocide, see WAZIYATAWIN, supra note 127, at 
37–62. 
 130.  Press Release, Mark Dayton, Governor, State of Minn., Governor Mark 
Dayton’s Statement Commemorating the U.S.-Dakota War of 1862 (Aug. 16, 
2012), available at http://mn.gov/governor/newsroom/pressreleasedetail.jsp 
?id=102-46359. 
 131.  Curt Brown, Dakota Cross Border to a 150-Year Old Welcome Home, STAR 
TRIB., Aug. 17, 2012, http://www.startribune.com/local/166553796.html?refer=y. 
 132.  WESTERMAN & WHITE, supra note 13, at 197–223 (describing recent, 
ongoing efforts to reclaim the land of the Dakota). 
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Minnesotans and Americans everywhere to join them by 
repudiating the Doctrine of Christian Discovery and to back that 
up with concrete acts of reparation to heal the trauma of the past. 
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